INTRODUCTION
The Southern Nevada Water Authority, the agency that provides Las Vegas with water, is in the process of building a massive pipeline from the easterncentral part of Nevada to Las Vegas.' "This pipeline is a nearly-unprecedented feat of engineering and water distribution and stands to move over 27 million gallons of water [a] year."
2 Once completed, the pipeline will be one of the largest of its kind in human history.
If the state of Nevada authorizes the state authority to push this project forward, it would help solve a pressing water supply problem for its largest population center: Las Vegas. But it will do so at the expense of less water for existing rural users. This includes Native American tribes who have fought mightily for decades to protect many of Nevada's rural water sources-including water that plays important cultural roles for the tribes. 4 You might imagine that there would be a clear answer to how the law regulates these critical interests. However, that is not the case. The nature of state powers and rights over the water within their territorial boundaries is unclear-that includes the states' rights when it comes to its private citizens, neighboring states, and the federal government.
Take Nevada itself which, by statute, has declared that " [t] he water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public." 5 As the waters of Nevada belong to the public, the state can presumably regulate water use (part of the state's police power), protect water resources for the public (known in water law parlance as the public trust doctrine), and go to court on behalf of the public's interest in water (referred to as parens patriae powers). These sovereign powers and rights would seem to give the state considerable control and even some duties over its water, but not the sweeping ability to reallocate massive amounts of water at willwhich is what we might expect if the state actually owned the water.
But what if a similar proposal were floated in a different state facing water allocation challenges, such as Wyoming. Wyoming's constitution provides: "The water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state." 6 This self-declaration of water ownership sounds like it gives the state fundamentally different rights over water. It suggests that the state has a proprietary power over all water within its territory. Perhaps the state could allocate and reallocate water to private users, denying water use at will so long as it serves some general governmental purpose.
If the water is simply state property, it can sell it off, hoard and store it for future speculative uses, or simply give it away when politically convenient. And if Wyoming owns the water within its borders, can it demand that its neighbors' water use have no physical transboundary impacts, essentially drawing a property line through the water cycle?
This article addresses some of the fundamental questions related to state waters. First, what exactly is the state's interest in its territorial waters? Second, what is meant by the oft-used term in water parlance: "waters of the state"? Does "waters of the state" simply mean state ownership of water as a piece of physical property? Or does it refer to the state's unique role as sovereign and steward over its water, which is a complex regime of overlapping rights and duties stemming from police powers, the public trust doctrine, the equal footing doctrine, and parens patriae standing (as you can guess-the authors will argue)? Third, does it matter how a state defines its waters? Finally, do state declarations about their water -from hydrology to ownership -align with our notions of property and sovereignty?
We conclude that declarations of water as state-owned property are fundamentally flawed. The United States Supreme Court long ago rejected assertions of state ownership of natural resources. From its start, American law has recognized that water by its nature cannot be one's property. 9 Thus, states cannot own water. Nor should they. The states can regulate water use pursuant to police powers, protect public interests within our federal system pursuant to parens patriae, and must even steward our water pursuant to the public trust doctrine.
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This article explores the "waters of the state" in three parts. First, we look to what the states say for themselves about water in their constitutions and statutes. This is not intended as a comprehensive survey, but rather a thorough sampling of the diversity in how states assert themselves over territorial water. There is a tremendous range in the scope of state assertions, in terms of both hydrologic (what waters are included) and legal scope (what states can and should do with water). The diversity and distinctions turn out to be of limited importance, though, at least on the ground. Instead, as discussed in the remaining sections, the bounds of a state's interests in its territorial waters are shaped by numerous other sources and rules that don't seem to pay much attention to the state's own declarations, from the quasi-Constitutional equal footing and public trust doctrines to interpretations of Constitutional due process and jurisdiction.
Next, this article examines the rights and powers over "waters of the state" beyond simple statutory assertions. State sovereign authority over territorial water begins with the equal footing doctrine." States have a general police power to regulate water use, subject to the rational basis test and due process limitations.12 States also have a sovereign and quasi-sovereign interest in their waters that they can protect in state and federal courts through parens patriae." And the public trust doctrine serves a dual role of empowering states to protect navigable waters while constraining states from divesting themselves of public water resources.14 Finally, this article analyzes assertions that "waters of the state" amounts to state ownership of water as property. This notion is an awkward fit with the other state rights and powers over territorial water -at times it is redundant, conflicting, and fundamentally inconsistent with other sovereignty doctrines. It is also undermined by the Supreme Court's rejection of the state ownership theory of natural resources." And most fundamentally, it is at odds with the very nature of water, which cannot be reduced to what we call "property." The flow of water transcends space and time, humbling intellectual and physical attempts at ownership. Rather than trying to own water as property, states should focus on fair allocation, long-term stewardship, and cooperative sharing within the federal system.
I. WHAT DO THE STATES HAVE TO SAY FOR THEMSELVES?
A logical place to start when attempting to understand the states' relationship with water is with the sovereign states themselves.
1 6 The specific enumeration of federal power and reservation of the remaining authority to the state means that states have substantial power when it comes to defining their relationship with resources within their borders." As a negative document, the Constitution uses the specific enumeration of federal power to empower the states with plenary police power over many matters, including their common resources and the wellbeing of their citizens. And the states have traditionally exercised plenary police power over all non-navigable waters within their borders.19 Further, states are the closest sovereign to the people, so it makes particular sense that they exercise broad authority over important local issues, such as water resource use. Aside from states' constitutional power to proclaim their relationship with water, there are normative reasons to prefer that states have wide latitude to define the nature of their relationship with water.
2 0 One of the oft-cited benefits of the federalist system is that it fosters experimentation. 21 And when it comes to water, that may just be the silver bullet. States in the U.S. are in the best position to identify specific water needs and experiment with solutions.
2 2 Of course, the state's water agenda may also be motivated by self-interest in maximizing use of a shared national resource. Consequently, while we begin by looking at what the states have to say for themselves, this will not be the last word on the subject.
States Colorado, 48 and Iowa. 49 The exceptions may cover water in various artificial water bodies such as built ponds and reservoirs. Alternatively, they may describe water that was artificially introduced. This limitation is also seen in eastern states such as Louisiana, 0 Indiana, 1 and Maryland, 5 2 which have excluded imported water, wastewater, and captured rainwater.
Another common distinction is based on the navigability of the water, a concept that often also relates to the state's public trust doctrine as well as numerous federal doctrines, discussed below. Some states use the term "public" waters to describe waters under state control. Several states distinguish between surface and groundwater, or water that is hydrologically connected to surface water and that which isn't. But on balance, this turns out to not be a terribly common problem. Most states either have broadly claimed state ownership over virtually all intrastate waters, or their courts have interpreted the language to effectively mean that. For example, Colorado courts have interpreted the "natural stream" language broadly to mean all tributary waters.
At bottom, states have taken several distinct positions when it comes to defining which waters are part of the "waters of the state." Next, we consider how states characterize these waters.
B. How Do States Characterize Waters of the State?
Following the range of waters that states assert control over, next comes the diversity of ways that states characterize their water. At one end of the spectrum are states that claim to own the water as state property. This takes the form of an outright statement that the state "owns" the water it claims, it has "title" to it, it is the state's "property," or it is the "state's water." This includes 42 A number of states term water as property, but assert that it is property owned by the "public." These states span the geography of the United States and include Florida, 65 Pennsylvania, 66 Utah, 67 Vermont, 68 Arizona, 69 New Mexico, 7 0
and Indiana." Some of these states say water is held by the public, but is subject to appropriation, like California 7 2 South Dakota, 3 and Nebraska.
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Other states do not characterize water as property, whether owned by the state or public. Instead, these states recognize water as a public good. For example, Kansas declares that the water within its borders is not owned, but instead "dedicated" to the use of everyone.
5 Consistent with non-ownership, some states explicitly frame their interest in water in terms of sovereignty and governance instead of property, such as Montana, 7 6 Delaware, North Dakota, Virginia, 7 9 and New Hampshire.o Similarly, some states such as Connecticut assert a public trust doctrine for water as an affirmative alternative to water as property. 86 Throughout the nineteenth century, the Court held that this same principle applied to every state as it entered the Union, vesting each with absolute "rights" to navigable water within their borders, as co-equal sovereigns. 87 This concept is referred to now as the "equal footing doctrine." 88 The equal footing doctrine stands for the simple proposition that as each state entered the Union, it took control of waterbeds and water within its borders as a matter of constitutional law and not as a matter of Congressional vestment. 89 The states thus have the power to allocate and govern these waterbeds, and the water above, subject to "the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign Few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that the private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper roots.... The private right to appropriate is subject not only to the rights of lower owners but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare and health. water. So while a reallocation of private water rights based solely on police powers may require compensation, the state would not owe anything for reallocating what it "owns."
Next, the public trust doctrine is added to the mix. The Supreme Court has described a state's rights and interests in water as a trustee for the public, which came to be known as the public trust doctrine. 1 00 In Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, the state had attempted to transfer a portion of the Lake Michigan shoreline to a private company for economic development. 101 The Supreme Court struck down the giveaway of water resources, holding that the state cannot use, dispose, or divest itself of these resources if there is "substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters."
1 02 This is a stricter standard that the state is subject to when administering its sovereign police powers. The limitation on alienation is totally at odds with administering a proprietary interest in water. Instead, the public trust doctrine offers an alternative theory of state water control, distinct from police powers and property. The Supreme Court explained the difference between title as property and title pursuant to the public trust doctrine: That the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that the state holds title to soils under tide water, by the common law, we have already shown; and that title necessarily carries with it control over the waters above them, whenever the lands are subjected to use. But it is a title different in character from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which are open to pre-emption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. 1 03 In short, states have significant power to regulate water stemming from their basic sovereignty and their stewardship duties under the public trust doctrine. Next, we consider what happens when these powers conflict with the rights of those of the state's citizens.
B. When State Powers Conflict with Private Use of Water
State courts have advanced all three bases for state control of water in various disputes, usually with private parties.' As described below, some courts 100. "The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people." Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 53 (1821).
101. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 433 (1892). Illinois Cent. R. Co. is cited in Enbridge Annex II for the proposition "that most classes of natural resources (such as navigable waters) belong to the public, while being held and protected by the government." This is a fair, if overly simple, description of the public trust doctrine, and as discussed above and further in Part IV, is a fundamentally difference concept than ownership as property. Private property interests in water can be murky upon first view. Water cannot be privately owned; rather persons merely have rights in the use of water. This means that private water rights are usufructuary (rights of use, not possession), not fixed (they can fluctuate with conditions), and are generally based on either the reasonable use doctrine (rights correlative to other rights) or prior appropriation (rights based on the timing of capture). With these qualifications, states often recognize private property rights in the use of water. States with prior appropriation schemes historically favor private citizens more when it comes to conflicts between the states and private citizens. That is because prior appropriation is a more defined, specific property relationship. There are typically judicial decrees and a specific license to use a specific amount of water. These more definite features make it more likely that courts will support a private claim to water over a state. 1 08 Setting aside the appropriation versus the riparian distinction, courts have settled state versus private water claims in a few different ways. Some courts have held that states have a superior right to all water within their borders and that all private rights to water are subject to that superior state right. 109 Consequently, there is an active water market in some of these states, and takings claims are plausible.
Nebraska's constitution says that "The right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public interest." 17 This language suggests that the state would have the power to take water back from private citizens anytime it was in the public interest. But courts have struck down state interferences with private water rights, and noted in dicta, that interference with private water rights would result in "confiscation of the company's property without due process or payment of just compensation." 8
In particular, private parties have fared well in the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit. In Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, the Court held that California's reduction of State Water Project deliveries to comply with the Endangered Species Act was a physical rather than a regulatory taking. 119 The court reached this conclusion because "the denial of a right to the use of water accomplishes a complete extinction of all value," and "the government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of the contract rights with regard to that water and totally displaced the contract holder." 1 2 0 The Supreme Kan. 1956 The court also emphasized, though, that the state was not taking resources to give to another private individual, which supported the state's position.126 Other courts have explicitly held that water is simply so important to the health and welfare of a state that states should have unusually broad sovereign power to regulate water 127 use.
Courts in Kansas and Minnesota have similarly reasoned that constitutional grants of water to the public mean that states have a unique right to allocate and restrict water use. 12 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Washington explained in the context of a fishery case that the state "in its sovereign capacity, owns [resources] in the waters of the state." 12 9 It further explained that "the people of the whole state" own these resources. 130 In a similar vein, New Hampshire courts have held that the state has a unique sovereign interest in water that trumps private rights:
No constitutional or statutory ordainment exists by which the plaintiff may be held to have received any endowment of vested rights in public waters. The State's ownership and control of them arise as an incident of its sovereignty, and not from any taking of private property for public uses.
So while some courts have theorized that private citizens have no property rights to water, others have held that there is a property right, but that the state still has a superior claim so long as it is exercising its sovereign powers to ensure was interpreting an ownership policy provision in an insurance contract.
1 40 In short, the court needed to determine whether the state of California "owned" water.
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The court exhaustively reviewed the nature of California's sovereign relationship with water, concluding that it regulated water, but did not own it. 142 The court started with the legislative language in the statute, which gave all water to the "people" of California.1 43 The court noted that this language did not empower the state to take water for itself, nor did it empower individual people to take water. 144 This inability of the state to take outright possession of water, indiscriminately, was the lynchpin for the court as this meant that the state did not own the water within the traditional sense of the word. It also meant that the state could regulate water broadly, but that its relationship was different from one of title. 1 45 Even more interesting, the court emphasized that the state's rights to regulate water could not be interfered with by private citizens-this also brought the state's rights to water outside of the "ownership" gambit. 146 Colorado has held that restricting private water use, even in groundwater, is not a taking. 147 The court emphasized that under the state's prior appropriation scheme "[t]he well owners neither hold title to the water in their wells, nor do they have an unlimited right to use water from their wells. What they possess is a legally vested priority date that entitles them to pump a certain amount of tributary groundwater from their wells for beneficial use." 148 The court concluded that because there was no allegation that the state had violated its own water laws, there could be no taking. 149 In other words, the state gets to make its own rules, and as long as it follows them, there is no taking. Minnesota courts follow a similar course, explaining that "it is fundamental, in this state and elsewhere, that the state in its sovereign capacity possesses a proprietary interest in the public waters of the state. Riparian rights are subordinate to the rights of the public and subject to reasonable control and regulation by the state. state has "dominion and power to regulate" these waters.
1 5 1 New York courts have held that the state owns all fresh water, private or not, within the state.
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New York courts have distinguished between when a state is acting as a sovereign with regard to water or merely as a private actor. 15' A New York court held that restricting water for a "public use" was not a taking, so long as the water comes from a public waterway. 154 In that case "a sovereign act in the interests of navigation" takes precedence over "the 'ordinary riparian rights' in a navigable river incidental to the land."
15 5 But these courts have noted that when the waterway is not public, or the state is not acting for a sovereign purpose, the private user wins. 160 In another case, the Supreme Court explained that this sovereign power was limited:
[W]e find the public interest in the waters of the kingdom was understood to necessitate a retention of authority and the imposition of a concomitant duty to maintain the purity and flow of our waters for future generations and to assure that the waters of our land are put to reasonable and beneficial uses. This is not ownership in the corporeal sense where the State may do with the property as it pleases; rather, we comprehend the nature of the State's ownership as a retention of such authority to assure the continued existence and beneficial application of the resource for the common good. 161 In other words, the state can only trump private water rights if it can specifically articulate how the common good is being protected. This rule was applied by a Hawaii appellate court, which held that the state should not be granted a water easement over private property because, although it theoretically had the power to take one, it was required to articulate how the common good was served by the easement.162 South Dakota is another example of a state whose courts have held that the state has a sovereign, limited power over water, distinct from the traditional sense of ownership. 163 Michigan courts have been aggressive about giving the state broad control over water, based largely on public trust principles. The Michigan Supreme Court explains how the public trust doctrine defines the state's interest in waters and what is left for private ownership:
It will be helpful to recall that Michigan was carved out of the Northwest Territory; that the Territory was ceded to the United States by Virginia; that the United States held this territory in trust for future states to be created out of it; that the United States held the waters of navigable rivers and lakes and the soil under them in trust for the people, just as the British crown had formerly held them in trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery; that when Michigan entered the union of states, she became vested with the same qualified title that the United States had; that these waters and the soil under them passed to the state in its sovereign capacity, impressed with a perpetual trust to secure to the people their rights of navigation, fishing, and fowling. Now, it being the fact that the State of Michigan acquired title to all of the beds of its navigable waters in perpetual trust for the preservation of the public right of navigation, fishing, etc., and Pine river being navigable, how has it come about that the plaintiff, as riparian owner, has secured a title unimpressed with this trust? The answer is that he has no such title. If he has derived his title by purchase and grant from the State, he has taken it subject to the same trust with which it was impressed while vested in the State we can no more close a public waterway because some of those who use it annoy nearby property owners, than we could close a public highway for similar reasons. In any event, the state sought a decision that would protect its right to this stream. With that right, which we now recognize, goes a responsibility to keep it as God made it."). title held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties . . . " 166 These cases paint a mosaic of approaches to state interests in water resources. The bulk of states and state courts recognize that states have some sort of affirmative sovereign power over water that is distinct from either traditional property theories or the limitations of the public trust doctrine. The nature of that power is nebulous and certainly not universal. Indeed, some states do not seem to give the state much power separate from what any private citizen has. But on balance, most states do claim a special sovereign power over water, and for many, it is subject to the public trust doctrine. With that, we turn to the state's powers related to interstate waters and the ability for states to sue on behalf of their citizens under the parens patriae doctrine.
C. State Rights to Interstate Waters and Parens Patriae Standing
The nature and source of state water rights has also been explored in various federalism disputes and conflicts between neighboring states. The federal government often steps on the states' toes when it comes to water and vice versa. This includes state authorizations of water draws that somehow involve federal lands or waterways and also competing federal water uses. 167 If states have a deeper sovereign ownership interest over their water, perhaps there are reasons to rethink some of our federal water concepts. Thus, the question of state ownership is important to settling state versus state interests in water.168 The stage was set for this issue in the recent case of Mississippi v. Tennessee, which involved a claim that a state actually owned the corpus of its water. 1 69 Recently, state governments have increasingly advanced social change and protected important interests via the state's parens patriae powers which allows a state to sue on behalf of the collective interests of a state's citizens. This vehicle could empower states to further control water within its borders, merely by arguing that someone or something is threatening a state's collective citizens' interest in the water supply or quality.
The doctrine of parens patriae originated in English common law and was first incorporated into American law in a series of United States Supreme Court cases early in the twentieth century. Md. 1972 ) (addressing damage claim in a parens patriae capacity for injury to its waters and marine life allegedly resulting from marine oil spills, and holding that the state may care for its own in utilizing the boundaries of nature within her borders because it has "technical ownership" of such boundaries or, when ownership is in no one, because the state may for the common good exercise all the authority that technical ownership ordinarily confers); State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 351 A.2d 337, 338 (1976) (the state of New Jersey brought an action against defendant public utility to recover damages, as parens patriae, because of the death of a large number of menhaden fish, allegedly caused by the sudden flow of cold water into a stream in connection with the defendant's operation of a nuclear power plant. Affirming the lower court's judgment in favor of the state, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the state did not have a proprietary right to the fish in its waters sufficient to support an action.).
177.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 559-64 (1851) (holding original jurisdiction appropriate for state plaintiff bringing public nuisance claim against diverse party for obstruction of navigable water due to bridge construction and location). parens patriae is a theory of standing, which requires the state to identify some cause of action it can bring on behalf of its citizens.
In this section, we have explored the complicated relationship between states and water. There was a lot to unpack, including states' police powers over water, their powers over interstate waters, and more. If one thing is clear, it is that states have a robust sovereign power over water. However, as we conclude in the next section, this power is not one of property.
III. DO STATES OWN WATER AS PROPERTY?
State sovereignty over water is well established, and the public trust doctrine is increasingly taking hold, leaving little room for the idea, and application, of state ownership of water as property. Further, state ownership of natural resources has been rejected by the Supreme Court, and the very concept of water as property is flawed. 1 7 9 But the language of property, ownership, and related terms (e.g., "title") has enduring power, despite the precedential and logical opposition.
A. The Life and Death of the State Ownership Theory in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court caused much of the confusion regarding water as property, in cases before and near the turn of the nineteenth century, by using language indicating that states had actual title in water, not just the power to regulate them. For example, in Donnelly v. United States, the Court said "that the title of the navigable waters, and the soil beneath them, was in the state, and subject to its sovereignty and jurisdiction." . Notably, state cases around the nation had already weighed in and often found sovereign ownership of water suspect. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821) ("The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people.").
These cases have been the primary ammunition for proponents of state water ownership theories.
1 8 2 In these cases, states raised their ownership over resources as a shield against federal doctrines, namely the dormant commerce clause and the privileges and immunity clause. 8 Thus, the Court was forced to deeply engage with the state ownership question.184
The facts of these cases are similar: a state wanted to allow its own citizens to have certain privileges over natural resources within their borders, while at the same time withholding these same privileges from citizens of other states.
5
The outsiders responded by citing the privileges and immunity or dormant commerce clause, arguing that a state could not discriminate or burden interstate commerce in this way.
1 86 The states arguing for control of the water riposted: we own these wild resources, and we can allocate our property to our citizens as we see fit.
1 7
In 1823, in Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Washington explained that New Jersey could prevent citizens of other states from harvesting oyster beds within New Jersey. 8 The Court reasoned that New Jersey owned these beds, and that "in regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of [a] state, the legislature is [not] bound to extend to the citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to their own citizens."
1 89
This set the stage for McCready v. Virginia, which was decided roughly thirty years later. 190 The Court held that Virginia, on behalf of its citizens, held "a property right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship" in the water beds.191 Then about twenty years later, in Geer v. Connecticut, Connecticut tried to control who could take game birds living within its boundaries, and a challenge was brought under the commerce clause. 192 The Court left little doubt that it believed that the state, on behalf of its citizens, owned the wild game within its 194 There, the Court upheld a New Jersey statute prohibiting the transfer of waters out of state. 195 The Court reasoned that "the constitutional power of the state to insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as to future needs." 196 Some language in Hudson explicitly couched the state's water interest as "property." 197 Furthermore, the Court relied heavily on Geer, which the Court would explain many years later, when it overturned this case, "was premised on the theory that the state owned its wild animals and therefore was free to qualify any ownership interest it might recognize in the persons who capture them." 198 However, it is worth looking closely at the language the Court used here. Although deferential to the state, the Court spoke about water in Hudson very differently than it spoke of other wild resources in McCready, Geer, and Corfield.
For example, in
199 The Court's hesitance to attach the "property" label to water, even in this time of extreme deference to state ownership interests, is palpable. The Court does not say that states "have title" to water-as it had when talking about oysters and water beds in Corfield and McCready. 200 Nor did the Court say that states "owned" water, as it had when talking about wild birds in Geer.201 Instead, the Court was careful to base its decision in Hudson on a "principle of public interest and the police power, and not merely as the inheritor of a royal prerogative." 202 The Court repeatedly described state interest as one of "protecting natural resources," not protecting state title. 203 The Court made this clear by stating "the state, as quasisovereign and representative of the interests of the public, has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its territory." 204 Although the Court in some early cases used language about state "ownership," practically, it was not treating state interest in wild resources as a property right. 205 
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Trelease, infra note 247, at 644 ("As for interstate rights, the United States Supreme Court has on numerous occasions apportioned the waters of interstate rivers among states without reference to state stream ownership, using instead concepts of sovereignty or parens patriae."). Trelease also points out that states during this early period relied on their plenary police powers to apportion water between their own citizens, not a state title tracing theory. Id.
207
See infra note 206, infra note 208, and accompanying text.
208.
See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920); see also California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158, 163-64 (1935) (stating the act "effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain . . . from the land itself," and that therefore "all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states").
209.
It turns out the U.S. Supreme Court's modern cases were perhaps more intuitive than even the Court realized. The decision that states can't own water under the early court's conceptualization of derivative ownership on behalf of a state's citizens now makes sense in light of state law cases because, as discussed below: individuals can't "own" water either. n.46 (1964) (discussing how the "ownership of water" is a "bit of legal mysticism" and that the "confusion between the attributes of ownership and authority has persisted to this day"). Like it did in Missouri vs. Holland, the Court found important the fact that the shrimp at issue here were "migratory." 2 1 6 But the Court then went farther, calling into question the entire concept of states owning wild resources: "The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource." 2 17 The Court thus explained that when courts say states "own" wild resources, they really mean that states have the power to regulate the resource vis-A-vis their own citizens 
B. Water is Not Property
The Supreme Court's skepticism of state ownership and water as state property is consistent with centuries of English and American water law that has generally rejected the idea that water can be owned as property by anyone.239 Water rights do not, as a species of property, fall within our normal sense of property in land and chattels.
2 40 Unlike land and buildings, water in natural watercourses is neither static nor well-defined; it moves and it changes. As the famous maxim goes "One cannot step into the same stream twice."241 "Running water at one instance is at one place in the river, then it is gone and some other water has succeeded it, without anyone having been able to tag it as his own; a thing in continual motion and ceaseless change, incapable of possession or ownership in that condition." Justinian's Code put sovereign property relationships into two categories:
sovereign dominium and sovereign imperium. Imperium is an exercise of sovereign authority over something-it may sometimes look like property, but in reality, it is just the government's ability to regulate something.
24 5 Dominium is a tangible property right.
2 46 Courts and scholars have often pointed to Justinian's Code for the proposition that water cannot be "owned", or in other words, that sovereigns can only have a relationship of imperium with water, by citing the phrase "all of these things are by natural law common to all: air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently, the shores of the sea." 247 Or, in more contemporary terms discussed above, water is not the state's property; rather it's a public trust for which the state is merely a trustee.
Early England tended to view virtually all resources, including water, as the sovereign's property. 248 This theory that states could "own" water was not without critics.249 For example, Lord Hailsham's famous summary of English law explained that "[a]lthough certain rights as regards flowing water are incident to the ownership of riparian property, the water itself, whether flowing in a known and defined channel or percolating through the soil, is not, at common law, the subject of property or capable of being granted to anybody." After the American Revolution and throughout the early and midnineteenth century, the United States adopted the English model of sovereign control of water, but with a democratic twist. 254 Early United States jurisprudence reasoned that the federal government inherited waterbeds and water, and then transferred title to each state as it entered the Union.
2 55 The twist was that, because the "people" are sovereign in America, the states held title to water and other wild resources on behalf of their collective citizens, not on behalf of the Crown as a 256 sovereign entity. American law, relying on English precedents, has always made clear that one cannot own water itself, but merely have a right of use:
Flowing water, as well as light and air, are in one sense 'publici juris.' They are a boon from providence to all, and differ only in their mode of enjoyment. Light and air are diffused in all directions, flowing water in some. When property was established, each one had the right to enjoy the light and air diffused over, and the flowing water through, the portion of soil belonging to him. The property in the water itself was not in the proprietor of the land through which it passes, but only 
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Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (The tide-based navigation distinction was the initial rule in the colonies, but later courts shifted to conclude that states holds presumptive title to navigable waters even if they are not subject to the tide.); see, e.g., Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tenn. Co., 32 F. at 19 ("The information rightly states that prior to the Revolution the shore and lands under water of the navigable streams and waters of the province of New Jersey belonged to the king of Great Britain, as part of the jura regalia of the crown, and devolved to the state by right of conquest. The information does not state, however, what is equally true, that after the conquest the said lands were held by the state, as they were by the king, in trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, beacons, and other facilities of navigation and commerce."). As we will see below, many states have adopted this position. While some other states have adopted the old English approach. Although certain rights as regards flowing water are incident to the ownership of riparian property, the water itself, whether flowing in a known and defined channel or percolating through the soil, is not, at common law, the subject of property or capable of being granted to anybody." 25 9 Thus, water is not property. It cannot be owned; not by the state, nor anyone else.
CONCLUSION
So what is the legal meaning of "Waters of the State"? We began with state assertions over territorial waters, which differ on what water they claim an interest in, where they claim that interest comes from, and what that interest is. Some states claim that they outright own water and some claim they have limited regulatory rights over their water. Similarly, state courts are also divided over how to practically treat state rights over water. Most states treat their relationship with water as one of sovereign regulation, not traditional property ownership. The state's sovereignty goes beyond general police powers to a more fundamental interest in water that can trump private property rights. Only a small number of states, either statutorily, constitutionally, or judicially, have taken full, property-like ownership over water.
Words have meanings, thus calling state water "property" would have significant doctrinal implications. Private rights flow from state rights to water. If states own the water as property, how can their citizens own it, too? The balance of powers between the federal government and states, as well as the rights of states with respect to neighboring states (i.e., water federalism), could be affected by the question of water as state property. Specifically, the types and nature of legal actions states can take against other states, private entities, and the federal government when their interests in territorial water are impacted depends fundamentally on whether the state is taking legal action as the owner of water as property, or in some other sovereign capacity.
Calling something "property" also has cultural and legal significance. A long line of scholars have persuasively questioned the significance and meaning of the term to the point that it is nothing but an empty space in which to put various rights and interests. Yet "property" persists. In popular use, property gives its owner special rights, and while first-year law students learn those rights are far from absolute, they are distinct from whatever interest the public has in the thing at issue. Our legal system treats almost every tangible thing, and many intangible things, as property. Our culture, even our language, leaves little room for anything that is not a person or property that a person can own. What would we even call that which is not property and cannot ever be owned? (Lawyers get to rely on Latin).
But water is the exception. The physical and social realities of water -most notably that it is fluid and a public necessity -have rounded its corners such that it would not fit in the square hole of property. Admittedly, we all, from the highest appellate courts to the basest casebook authors, have used the term "property" to describe water. Certainly, in the context of private persons and parties, calling water one's property is simply legally incorrect. And we conclude the words of ownership and property similarly have no place in "waters of the state."
Instead, as a matter of both federal and state law, the public trust doctrine best describes state powers over water. Perhaps more than any other legal authority, it creates unique state rights and duties with respect to water. The public trust doctrine makes clear that state title is not one of ownership, and the water itself is certainly not state property. Rather, the water is a public good, the public are its beneficiaries, and the state is merely the trustee, who is empowered to protect and constrain from alienation and degradation. In short, the state does not own water as property but is the lawful steward of the resource for us all. "Waters of the State" is not a claim of ownership, but rather an acknowledgment of the sovereign power to protect and steward our most precious public resource.
